Opinion | Here's Why Jammu Is Seeing An Escalation In Terrorist Activities

The Indian Army's 28th Infantry Division was deployed in Kargil following the capture of Siachen by the Army. It was subsequently moved to Kupwara in 1991 as militancy gripped the Valley. Nine years later, Pakistan captured the Kargil heights, leading to the Kargil War.

In his book Gorkha Hat and Maroon Beret, Lt Gen Chandra Shekar notes the decision to release the 28th Infantry Division for deployment in the Kashmir Valley. This involved removing dedicated reserves from the Ladakh sector, a necessity that was acutely felt during the Kargil War in May 1999.

A large contingent of troops in Kashmir was redeployed to Kargil, contributing to India's victory in the conflict. The silver jubilee of this victory was observed on July 26.

How Pakistan Exploited A Gap

However, following the end of the Kargil War, a security gap in the Kashmir Valley allowed Pakistan to deploy highly indoctrinated fidayeen (suicide squads), which significantly altered the nature of militancy in the region. The Valley experienced a surge in ruthless attacks, resulting in the deaths of numerous security forces, civilians, and political leaders. This wave of violence was only mitigated when infiltration was largely halted, thanks to the Army's fencing of the 700 km-long Line of Control and a ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan in 2003.

In June 2020, after a deadly confrontation between the Indian and Chinese armies in Eastern Ladakh, the Army withdrew one division from the then-peaceful Pir Panjal region (Poonch and Rajouri districts) and redeployed it to Eastern Ladakh. This was part of a massive mobilization to match the number of Chinese troops stationed along the Line of Actual Control. Early this year, the Army was compelled to redeploy a division to the now-troubled Pir Panjal region.

Much like the post-Kargil situation in Kashmir, the security gap in the Pir Panjal region was exploited by handlers in Pakistan. They began pushing highly trained militants, many believed to be Afghan war veterans and ex-Pakistani regulars.

By October 2021, Pakistani militants had entrenched themselves in the forests of Poonch and Rajouri. They launched precise attacks on the army, causing casualties among troops while suffering few or no casualties themselves.

From Kashmir To Jammu

The spate of deadly attacks has now spread across the Jammu region. Recently, the Army had to deploy additional troops as districts like Kathua, Udhampur, Reasi, and Doda became as vulnerable as Pir Panjal. The government has also revamped civilian militias, known as Village Defense Guards (VDGs), which now number around 28,000, to defend against terrorist attacks.

So, why has the theatre of militancy shifted or expanded from the Valley to Jammu?

While security challenges on India's borders, military engagement, and militancy in Jammu and Kashmir are intertwined, local factors seem to have enabled a shift in militant strategy. Here's why...

During long periods of militancy, the Valley acted as a buffer, insulating the Jammu region and the rest of the country. According to police records, over 20,000 militants have been killed in Kashmir over the last three decades. This includes hundreds of foreign militants from 14 different nationalities, who were pushed into the Valley to sustain the conflict. Effectively, the Valley absorbed these militants and, in the process, suffered greatly.

The buffer in the Valley that once absorbed the brunt of Pakistan-sponsored insurgency has eroded. Pakistan no longer views Kashmiri mainstream leaders as Indian puppets. Instead, the dynamic has reversed; the government and ruling party frequently accuse regional leaders of fostering terrorism and separatism. Recently, the J&K police chief claimed that Pakistan has successfully infiltrated key sectors of civil society through mainstream and regional parties in the Valley, alleging that these parties have cultivated terrorist leaders for electoral gains.

The Erosion Of The Mainstream

The presence of local officials in bureaucracy and key police positions has diminished in significance. The Kashmiri mainstream, which once governed Jammu and Kashmir, has lost its political relevance in the absence of an elected government, statehood, and a functioning electoral process.

With the former ruling class of Kashmir now resembling the ruled, Pakistan's perceptions of the Valley have shifted. Even the shutdown calls and notorious stone-pelting incidents previously were aimed to assert control between mainstream and separatists.

Politically, the buffer in Kashmir had insulated Delhi from blame. From the arrest of the then Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in 1953, the dilution of Jammu and Kashmir's semi-autonomous status in 1965, to the dismissal of the Farooq Abdullah government by Indira Gandhi in 1984, Delhi ensured that blame was directed away from itself. Instead, Kashmiri partners or collaborators were held accountable for issues in the Valley.

By shifting the focus of militancy, Pakistan is turning Jammu into a powder keg, extending unrest up to the Punjab border. Besides attempts to incite communal strife, the goal appears to be to increase the cost of maintaining security while the Army faces challenges on two fronts.

The recent BAT-type attack - a ruthless Pakistani military border action team assault - on an army post near the LOC in Kupwara is seen as an attempt to escalate tensions at the borders. This attack occurred a day after India celebrated Kargil Vijay Diwas, during which the Prime Minister issued a stern warning to Pakistan over the spate of terrorist attacks.

Highly Trained Militants

In the past three years, militants have established safe havens in the mountains of Jammu. They are trained in jungle warfare, and equipped with US-made M4 carbines and steel-core bullets for targeting armored vehicles. For communication, they use encrypted state-of-the-art mini satellite systems, heavily protected against interception.

While security forces are capable of handling militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, the primary challenge is the absence of credible human intelligence. In Kashmir, informers or 'mukhbirs' had long perfected the art of assisting security forces discreetly. Such channels are currently lacking in the Jammu region.
Since the buffer in Kashmir has eroded, there is silence in the Valley and violence in Jammu.

(Nazir Masoodi is NDTV's Srinagar Bureau Chief.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author