Opinion | 11 Reasons Simultaneous Elections Aren't 'Anti-Constitution'

Following a brief debate on December 17, 2024, Law Minister Arjun Ram Meghwal introduced the 129th Constitution Amendment Bill in the Lok Sabha. The Bill, which seeks to institute simultaneous elections to both the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies, was put to a division of votes at the insistence of Opposition members, ultimately passing with 269 votes in support and 198 in opposition. It has now been referred to a joint parliamentary committee for closer examination.

Several Opposition MPs argued that holding concurrent elections would infringe upon the Constitution's basic structure. The Indian National Congress, in its submission to the High-Level Committee (HLC) on simultaneous elections, claimed that such a reform would bring about “substantial changes to the basic structure of the Constitution”. The Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) similarly contended that simultaneous elections would weaken democracy, a core constitutional value. Echoing these sentiments, many Opposition leaders called the Bill “anti-federal”.

Yet, despite these allegations, the Bill does not contravene the basic structure doctrine. In fact, there are 10 compelling reasons why it remains consistent with the Constitution's foundational principles.

Constitution Allows Flexibility

One, simultaneous elections were a norm in the early years of the Republic (1951-52, 1957, 1962, and 1967) without any adverse impact on the constitutional framework or democratic ethos. The continuation of a constitutionally sanctioned practice cannot be deemed to violate the basic structure. No judicial pronouncement has held that the earlier practice of simultaneous elections was unconstitutional or detrimental to the Constitution's core features.

Two, it is often argued that simultaneous elections run afoul of the Constitution's basic structure because they may necessitate the early dissolution of State Legislative Assemblies—bodies composed of elected representatives—thereby, in effect, going against the people's expressed mandate.

However, as the report by the HLC has argued, the Constitution itself contemplates that the duration of both the House of the People and the Legislative Assemblies shall be “five years unless dissolved sooner”. This formulation highlights that the framers consciously introduced flexibility into legislative tenures. Since premature dissolution is already constitutionally sanctioned, its calibrated use to achieve synchronised election cycles does not introduce any fundamentally new or prohibited element into the constitutional scheme.

No Threat To Basic Structure

Three, the essential features of the basic structure—such as the trilogy of rights (Articles 14, 19, and 21), fundamental freedoms, the balance between Parts III and IV, secularism, and independence of the judiciary—remain untouched. The HLC report explicitly states that the criticisms of simultaneous elections “do not impinge upon citizens rights under Part III or the rule of law or any other features such as a free and independent judiciary”. Therefore, no core constitutional value recognised in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (AIR 1973 SC 1461) is impaired.

Four, democracy, recognised as part of the basic structure (Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461; Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachilhu, AIR 1993 SC 412), is not jeopardised by holding elections together. Periodic, free, and fair elections remain intact. The proposed amendment does not curtail the citizens' right to vote or their ability to choose representatives. It merely synchronises election timings, ensuring the democratic principle of periodic electoral endorsement is fully preserved.

Five, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed free and fair elections as integral to democracy and hence to the basic structure (Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299; Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms, AIR 2002 SC 2112). The proposed amendment does not amend the powers, functions, or independence of the Election Commission of India, nor does it dilute judicial review mechanisms. Hence, the fairness and integrity of the electoral process remain unimpaired.

Six, while democracy is fundamental, the right to vote and the right to contest are not fundamental rights; they are constitutional and statutory rights (N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, AIR 1952 SC 64; Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, AIR 2006 SC 3127). Aligning elections does not restrict or remove these rights; it merely adjusts their timing. No provision of the proposed amendment converts these rights into something constitutionally impermissible, nor does it interfere with their statutory framework.

Constitution Is Still Supreme

Seven, federalism, though part of the basic structure, is not absolute in the Indian context. Indian federalism is sui generis—“quasi-federal” or “cooperative federalism” (S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918; Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCALE 72). The proposed amendment does not alter the distribution of legislative or executive powers. It does not affect the competence of States, their legislative autonomy, or the constitutional status of the Union-State relationship. Rather, it preserves the federal balance while enhancing administrative efficiency.

Eight, the supremacy of the Constitution and judicial review—core features of the basic structure (Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789)—are neither suspended nor diluted by the proposed amendment. Courts retain their full authority to strike down unconstitutional acts. The amendment only reorganises electoral timetables and does not immunise any measure from judicial scrutiny.

Nine, secularism, rule of law, and separation of powers—hallmarks of the basic structure—remain intact (S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918; M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, AIR 2007 SC 71). The amendment does not impinge upon the authority of Parliament, State Legislatures, or the judiciary. It does not alter the constitutional scheme of governance but merely standardises the electoral calendar.

Ten, for a violation of basic structure to occur, the constitutional identity itself must be threatened or altered (I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861). Synchronising elections neither changes the identity of the Constitution as a democratic, republican, and federal polity nor introduces any new constitutional element that is repugnant to the existing constitutional ethos.

Eleven, the objective behind simultaneous elections is a matter of electoral management rather than constitutional restructuring. Such efficiency measures do not dismantle the foundational pillars of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified that what is proscribed is the destruction or emasculation of the Constitution's core features, not procedural or administrative reforms consistent with its principles (Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845).

"Misplaced" Criticisms

The proposal to synchronise electoral cycles, aimed at minimising the frequency of elections, reducing administrative costs, and mitigating the repeated invocation of the Model Code of Conduct, finds support among eminent jurists, thereby reinforcing its constitutional propriety. In particular, the former Chief Justice of India, Justice Dipak Misra, in his letter dated February 28, 2024, to the HLC, opined that criticisms of simultaneous elections as antithetical to the basic structure or federal principles are “misplaced”. He invoked the “doctrine of expansion” and the “doctrine of reduction” vis-à-vis the constitutional flexibility to extend or curtail legislative tenures in exceptional circumstances, underscoring that “India, being quasi-federal, simultaneous elections for the House of the People and State Legislative Assemblies are not anti-federal”.

Further elucidating the benefits, Justice Misra emphasised that “synchronising elections at the National and State levels could lead to greater administrative efficiency by reducing the frequency of elections and associated costs”. He observed that this measure “could benefit both the Central Government and State Governments” and enhance governance by enabling representatives to dedicate greater attention to legislative and executive functions, free from the interruptions of staggered elections. He explicitly concluded that the “adoption of One Nation, One Election in India is likely to brook well with the spirit of the Constitution and also with the principles of collaborative federalism”.

Politics Over Reforms

While the Opposition's objections to simultaneous elections appear to be driven more by political expediency than constitutional merit, the arguments they present fail to withstand legal scrutiny. The framers of the Constitution envisaged a flexible framework for legislative terms, and the proposed amendment merely harmonises this flexibility to achieve stability and efficiency in governance.

As Justice Dipak Misra aptly remarked, simultaneous elections neither undermine federalism nor violate the Constitution's basic structure; rather, they “brook well with the spirit of the Constitution” and embody the principles of collaborative federalism. If anything, the opposition's insistence on clinging to staggered elections reflects a misplaced reluctance to embrace reforms that prioritise governance over perpetual politicking.

(Aditya Sinha is a public policy professional and an author.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author