Mohammad Yunus, the Nobel Prize winner, was in China recently, and in an exercise best characterised as one of supreme oratory acrobatics, he wove Northeast India into a narrative that reduces Bangladesh to the exclusive guardian of the Bay of Bengal. If this was a geopolitical chess move, it was one made with an aura of reckless irony—one that not only distorts reality but also threatens to inflame an already sensitive relationship with India.
A Laureate's Foray Into Grandstanding
In China, a nation that has turned playing the power broker in South Asia into an art form, Yunus decided to go lyrical about how strategically significant Bangladesh is, labelling it as the "only guardian of the sea" in South Asia. This would be funny if not so dishonest.
It is impossible not to be impressed by the sheer audacity of such a statement. To say that Bangladesh, which has 710 kilometres of coastline, is the sole guardian of the Bay of Bengal is to assert that Monaco is the absolute monarch of the Mediterranean. If this were just nationalist bombast, it could be safely ignored as empty posturing. But Yunus went beyond that.
With a sleight of hand that would shame an experienced magician, he brought India's Northeast into the story, the implied suggestion being that the access to the sea for the region lies at the whim of Dhaka. Naturally, this completely ignores India's own deep-sea ports, its burgeoning maritime strength, and its historically ancient trade routes. But why let facts spoil a good diplomatic play?
The Northeast: A Convenient Pawn in the Narrative
There is something richly symbolic about Yunus's bid to make Bangladesh the exclusive gateway between the Indian Northeast and the world economy. He demonstrated that infatuation in Paris, even a few days before he took charge of the beleaguered country. The Northeast, with its convoluted topography and sensibilities forged in history, has been a place of intrigue and contest for centuries. But any suggestion that India's Northeast has no access to the sea except through Bangladesh is not only erroneous—it is an outright fabrication.
India has been heavily investing in its own maritime infrastructure. The Sittwe Port in Myanmar, which was built under India's Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, is a clear indication of India's attempts to decrease dependence on Bangladesh for sea access. In addition, the Northeast is well-linked to Kolkata and other ports through extensive road and rail networks, with projects currently underway to further improve connectivity.
But Yunus's claim does have a specific agenda: it adds fuel to Dhaka's increasing narrative that the key to regional trade lies in Bangladesh, conveniently overlooking India's long strategic options. This is not merely a naive mistake—it is a deliberate attempt to make Bangladesh geopolitically relevant at the expense of truth.
A Love-Hate Relationship
If there's one nation that has gone to great lengths to appease Bangladesh's ascension, it is India. From underwriting Bangladesh's independence in 1971 to giving preferential trade concessions, India has been a regional stabilising influence throughout. The surrender of Pakistan's 93,000 soldiers to the Indian Army at Dhaka in 1971 came at the expense of about 3,000 Indian soldiers' lives. But more often than not, Dhaka's political leaders and, these days, even many of its intellectuals, seem to have an almost stereotypical compulsion to provoke the bear.
There is no question that Bangladesh has gone a long way in economic development and progress, surpassing India in many human development indices, but its habit of playing both sides of the geopolitical fence—courting Beijing even as it attempts friendly relations with New Delhi—has tended to border on reckless opportunism. Bangladesh's increasing economic ties with China, such as the growing dependence on Chinese investments in strategic infrastructure, have not escaped India's notice. But for a public icon like Yunus to utilise China as a platform for undermining India's stand in the region is a whole different level of misreading.
China: The Convenient Audience
It should be no surprise, therefore, that Yunus decided on China as the arena of his statements. Beijing long desired to reinforce its footprint within the Bay of Bengal by using Bangladesh as a willing accomplice in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By blowing a whistle loudly that Bangladesh is China's predominant seagoing entryway for the region, Yunus unwittingly (or probably with motive) echoes the stated aspirations of Beijing itself.
China, naturally, greets such stories with alacrity. For years, it has been trying to chip away at India's regional dominance, and having their neighbour's star ‘leaders' play into its hands is the ultimate fantasy. The question is, however, whether Dhaka fully appreciates the fallout of such grandstanding. Playing the China card may be a shrewd diplomatic move, but one that is accompanied by strings—strings that have a habit of turning into nightmares.
The Real Guardian Of The Bay
For all of Yunus's bombastic rhetoric, reality is harshly different. India's Andaman and Nicobar Command is the Bay of Bengal's principal military base, and India's navy commands the most assertive maritime presence there. The country's sea trade routes, naval patrols, and disaster relief arrangements are primarily powered by Indian strength, rather than Dhaka's good wishes.
Even in commerce and trade, Bangladesh is not the sole gatekeeper Yunus assumes it to be. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), an alliance that involves India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, among others, guarantees that one country does not have complete dominance over regional sea affairs.
If Dhaka thinks it is the only custodian of the sea, it might have to go back to the very basics of regional geopolitics.
Adding Fuel To The Fire
At a time when India and Bangladesh are struggling to resolve sensitive issues such as the Teesta water-sharing dispute, cross-border trade imbalances, and the Rohingya crisis, etc, Yunus's statement helps little to promote goodwill. Rather, they introduce an extra layer of tension into a relationship already characterised by cautious diplomacy.
New Delhi has thus far been indulgent towards Bangladesh's flirtations with Beijing, aware of the economic compulsions that dictate Dhaka's decisions. But indulgence has its limits. If personalities as powerful as Yunus start to amplify stories that attempt to downplay India's role in the region and exaggerate Bangladesh's bargaining power, Dhaka will not be long in facing a much less indulgent neighbour. History has repeatedly demonstrated that driving India into a defensive position seldom works out well for its smaller neighbours.
Pride vs Overreach
There is nothing wrong with Bangladesh asserting itself in the world. Indeed, its economic development, despite its inbuilt challenges and strategic value, should be recognised and respected. But there is a thin line between national pride and strategic overreach. Announcing oneself as the "only guardian of the sea" while quietly undermining the region's greatest power is not only overreach—it is diplomatic hubris.
Yunus, in his history of advocating microfinance and social enterprise, would do well to keep in mind that credibility, just like goodwill, is earned hard but lost with ease. A Nobel Prize confers no immunity from geopolitical fact, nor does a passionate address in Beijing turn the tides of power in the Bay of Bengal. The sea does not bow to words, and neither does the region's balance of power.
(The writer, a senior social sector leader, can be reached at mbiswanath@gmail.com. The opinion expressed here is his own.)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
