In Bangladesh, what began as student demonstrations against job quotas quickly turned into the downfall of the country's longest-serving Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina. The protests, which began last month, turned violent on July 15 when the supporters of Hasina's Awami League clashed with the students, prompting the government to use tear gas shells, impose curfews, internet blockades, and shoot-at-sight orders. The opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) were also quick to join the movement, which further exacerbated the violence.
As of August 5, over 300 people had been killed and hundreds injured. As an angry mob marched into Dhaka on the same day, the army “took responsibility” of the country, and Hasina resigned.
While an interim government will soon be in place, the future of the country now hangs by a thread, and this is no good news for South Asia.
Hasina's Had Been A Success Story
Hasina's Bangladesh saw significant economic growth and development. The country managed to maintain an average GDP growth rate of 6.6% over the last decade, and its poverty decreased from 12% in 2008 to over 5% in 2022. Its GDP increased from $100 billion in 2009 to $460 billion in 2022. Given this trajectory, the country was expected to graduate from its Least Developed Country status by 2026.
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The last few decades also ushered in some political stability. By suppressing the 2009 mutiny of Bangladesh Rifles, Hasina had put to end the frequent military coups in the country and subordinated such forces to civilian authorities. She had also brought continuity and certainty to the country's external conduct, especially with the “Friendship to all, malice to none” foreign policy, which had been key in attracting investments and infrastructure from the West, India, Russia, China, and Japan alike.
A crucial aspect of her successful foreign policy had been winning India's trust and improving economic ties. Hasina respected India's three red lines, which the previous BNP and JI governments violated on multiple occasions. This included protecting Hindu minorities, clamping down on extremists and Northeast militants who targeted India from Bangladesh, and respecting Indian security sensitivities and concerns when engaging with hostile countries like Pakistan and China.
Under these robust ties, the trade between both countries grew from $2 billion in 2007 to $14 billion in 2022, and as of the following year, New Delhi had even offered Dhaka over $8 billion in credit lines.
Connectivity took precedence too with the reopening of rail lines, a push for transit and port access, and the construction of a diesel supply pipeline. Both countries also resolved their maritime disputes and ratified the land boundary pact, ushering in the “golden era of India-Bangladesh relations”.
India's Quest for Connectivity
Notably, New Delhi's trust for Hasina incentivised India to promote regional integration and connectivity through its own territory, something Dhaka had long been calling for. This was done for two reasons: one, it would help India's neighbours to boost their economies by fostering economic cooperation with each other, and two, it would help Delhi deter increasing Chinese presence and investments in these countries.
Dhaka's stability and economic growth also made it an attractive market for South Asian countries like Nepal and Bhutan, both of which possess great energy potential, even as they have scant foreign reserves and are landlocked and over-dependent on India. Bangladesh has looked up to these countries for importing energy, exporting its products, and further fuelling its economic growth.
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As a result, in 2022, India offered — though this has not been implemented yet — free transit to Bangladeshi trucks headed for Nepal and Bhutan. In June, New Delhi and Dhaka also signed an MoU that enabled Bangladesh railways to reach Nepal and Bhutan using Indian railway lines. Bangladesh itself permitted Bhutan to build a special economic zone in its territory, which would be crucial to the latter's Gelephu Special Administrative Region project when linked through India.
India, meanwhile, had recently agreed to facilitate electricity trade from Nepal and Bhutan to Bangladesh through Indian energy grids and transmission lines.
All these agreements would have helped Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh to tap into each others' resources and trade and save both time and cost, while also reducing their dependence on China.
No Good News For India Or Its Neighbors
However, the recent developments threaten to throw a massive spanner in the works. There are now new complexities to India-Bangladesh relations, and by extension, their ambitions for improving bilateral and regional connectivity.
First, the country's opposition, the BNP and the JI, are seeing a revival amid the protests and violence in the country. Both parties have historically advocated for close ties with Pakistan and China and have consistently violated India's red lines. Over the last decade, they have even furthered nationalist and religious sentiments against India by accusing Delhi of supporting Hasina. Protests by the BNP, the JI and hardline affiliates like Hefazat-e-Islam (HI) against Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Bangladesh in 2021, the recent “India Out” campaign supported by BNP leaders, and the criticism towards the MoU on railway connectivity indicate the Bangladesh opposition's continued scepticism towards India and its initiatives.
Most recently, their cadres and supporters stormed the Narsingdi jail and freed around 800 prisoners, some of whom are trained militants. Soon after Hasina's resignation, they targeted the country's Hindu minority community and Awami League supporters. These developments not only underscore the opposition's lack of concern for Delhi's sensitivities but also point to the grim possibility of an exodus and of a revival of Delhi's scepticism for Bangladesh. The Indian National Security Advisor's meeting with Hasina after she fled to India demonstrates Delhi's security concerns about the ongoing developments.
Growing Mistrust
Second, the students and protesters opposing Hasina have often accused India of supporting her regime. To what extent this rhetoric and narrative will grow depends on India's response to the ongoing developments. In fact, several activists are already alleging that India will deploy its troops to undo their “hard-won freedom”. Such mistrust is bound to make it difficult for any government to foster strong ties with India and deepen economic engagements.
Third, with the army having taken control over the country's administration, questions are being raised about whether the force would be able to maintain stability, especially given its history in the early years of Bangladesh's formation. With an angry populace involved in arsoning and violence throughout the country today, some have even expressed concern and dissatisfaction about a military administration. If this anger and disenchantment persist, it will lead to political and economic instability, impacting Bangladesh's economy, investments, and connectivity efforts. This could also have spillover implications for India.
The army also aims to dissolve the current parliament and establish an interim government in consultation with political parties and stakeholders. However, the fact that the latest such consultations on August 5 included student organisations and members of the JI, the HI, and the BNP but excluded the Awami League is not very reassuring for Delhi. The release of BNP supremo and Hasina's arch-rival Khaleda Zia, within hours of the former's ouster, raises similar concerns on the direction, composition, and intention of a potential interim government.
A Jolt For Delhi
Hasina's resignation is possibly one of the biggest strategic shocks for New Delhi in recent years. Her government's economic and foreign policy fostered a strong bond with India and made it a hub of regional connectivity and integration. With her ouster, all of this is at risk today. This is not to say that it would be entirely impossible for Delhi to find a way to work with a new regime, but any such initiative would be difficult given that it will require building trust and respecting each other's redlines — not an easy task given the history and politics of the two countries.
Until then, any good news from Dhaka will mostly elude Delhi and its neighbours.
(The author is Associate Fellow, Neighbourhood Studies, Observer Research Foundation)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author