Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Poland and Ukraine extends the geopolitical scope of India's foreign policy. No Indian Prime Minister has visited Poland for the last 45 years. In recent years, Poland has acquired considerable weight within the European Union (EU). It is a large country in size and population, and it has seen impressive economic growth since 1992, making it the EU's sixth-largest economy.
Modi has visited several countries that had not seen a prime ministerial visit from India for a very long time. This is part of a strategy to enlarge India's global footprint in line with our aspirations to play a bigger role on the world stage. In that sense, a visit to Poland would have seemed overdue.
A Ukraine Visit Had Become Unavoidable
No Indian Prime Minister has visited Ukraine since its independence in 1991. India has had productive ties with Ukraine, especially in the defence area, but these have been adversely affected by its conflict with Russia flowing from the regime change in the country in 2014. Modi will be the first Indian prime minister to visit Ukraine. Whether the conditions for a prime ministerial visit to Ukraine at the strictly bilateral level exist currently can be debated. At the geopolitical level, however, it could be argued that a visit had become more or less unavoidable.
Poland's hostility to Russia, anchored in history, is profound. The country's current president and the foreign minister in particular, as well as the prime minister, reflect it in their statements. This visceral animus towards Russia also explains the depth of Poland's ties with the US. Since 2008, Poland has hosted elements of the US anti-ballistic missile shield that the Russians believe is targeted against them, though the US claims that it is directed against Iran's missile capability. Poland strongly backs Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. As it happens, the western part of Ukraine is historically linked to Poland.
Is This An Appropriate Time?
It can be argued that India needs to reach out to Central and East European countries to expand its political footprint within the EU, with which it seeks to strengthen ties. The issue, however, is whether it is opportune to do so at this moment when both Ukraine and Poland are locked up in a military confrontation with Russia as front-line states with US and NATO support.
A proxy war is being conducted against Russia through Ukraine, with full Polish support, with the declared goal of imposing a strategic defeat on Russia, causing its economic collapse and isolating it internationally, even if these goals have not been met yet. The question arises whether we need to defer to Russia's sensitivities and concerns when it has been our privileged strategic partner for decades and has stood by us when we were under pressure from the West.
To what extent we should show solidarity with Russia and shun its adversaries when we have no quarrels with them, and, in this context, to what degree we should preserve the independence of our foreign policy and our strategic autonomy vis a vis all our major partners in the East and the West, are pertinent questions.
One can, of course, argue that we have not been deterred from forging increasingly close ties with the US, which is the principal promoter of the proxy war against Russia, or from our efforts to expand ties with the EU, or, within it, with countries like France and Germany, who are fuelling this proxy war too. This logic should dictate that we should not be inhibited from reaching out to Ukraine and Poland.
The Limits Of Foreign Policy
But then, foreign policy is not based on logic or principles applied mechanically. Policymakers have to assess where the balance of interests lies and the likely cost of not weighing the consequences of options taken. If we want to keep Russia firmly on our side, are there options we should eschew to avoid misunderstanding or create a perception that we are harming Moscow's legitimate interests? We can, of course, assume that Russia is a mature power with great experience in diplomacy, and that it can assess whether a decision taken by us is to further our legitimate national interest and not intended to hurt Russia's interests. India and Russia need not be on the same page on everything. Even the US and its allies in Europe have differences.
The issue in the case of Modi's visit to Poland and Ukraine at this time is that both countries have eschewed the language of dialogue and diplomacy to resolve the Ukraine conflict, with Ukraine and its NATO backers favouring some military success on the ground in order to force Russia to come to the negotiating table. This strategy assumes that Russia wants to avoid a war with NATO, which gives room to the military alliance to support limited escalatory actions in order to keep imposing costs on Moscow. This is the NATO version of an attrition strategy that Russia mirrors when it assumes that NATO will get tired of supporting the war as it is imposing costs on member states, and that public fatigue is already setting in.
Being Consistent
From India's point of view, after Modi's visit to Russia for the annual summit with a clear intention to develop stronger economic ties, and the signal given to the West once again that India will preserve the equities of its ties with Moscow, a visit to Ukraine could be put on the agenda.
Modi seems to have told Putin during his visit that Zelenskyy was pressing him to visit Ukraine and that he planned to go. Putin, apparently, did not demur. It could be reasoned that for Modi to counsel dialogue and diplomacy in Russia as well as internationally, and then baulk at visiting Ukraine as part of promoting his message of dialogue and diplomacy on Ukrainian soil, would have seemed inconsistent.
The Kursk Incursion By Ukraine
Regrettably, Zelenskyy, by launching his highly symbolic incursion into Kursk a few days before Modi's visit, has undercut its purpose. The US and others have been prodding India to play a helpful role in promoting a resolution of the conflict in Ukraine in view of New Delhi's close ties with Moscow. They have been disingenuous in promoting this line. If the US wants to seriously engage in a dialogue with Russia to find ways to end the conflict, it does not need India's intercession or that of any other country. Russia has said many times in the past that the key to a solution lies in US hands, not those of Europe or Ukraine.
In his post on X before departure, Modi said that in Ukraine, he wanted to "share his perspectives on the peaceful resolution of the ongoing Ukraine conflict" with Zelenskyy. This intriguing message suggests that he has a vision of how this conflict could be ended, which means he has in mind a broad perspective plan. In Moscow, Modi had said that he had well understood how Putin perceived the situation. But now, after Kursk, the Russian position has hardened, with Putin stating that there is no longer any room left for talks.
A Tricky Time In The US
No doubt, Zelenskyy will share his perspectives with Modi. And then what? Will India get into some sort of a mediatory role? Is that feasible when the US is in the throes of the presidential election, with Biden a lame-duck president who cannot change course because any retreat towards a search for peace after fuelling the conflict all these years could do damage to the Democratic party, as it would imply a failure of Biden's Ukraine policy?
Even if Zelenskyy's decision to make a territorial incursion into Russia has undermined Modi's peace effort, India could always claim that in view of the worsening of the situation, Modi's message against escalation and in favour of peace had become even more pressing and relevant.
Significantly, The Economist sees Modi's visit to Ukraine as a "redemption", implying that India has sinned and now it was seeking forgiveness from the West. This underlines how the West sees Modi's visit. Presumably, this arrogant and presumptuous journal believes Modi is awaiting absolution from the high priests of defunct British imperialism.
(Kanwal Sibal was Foreign Secretary and Ambassador to Turkey, Egypt, France and Russia, and Deputy Chief Of Mission in Washington.)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author