The latest terrorist attack in Udhampur has turned the spotlight on the proposed talks between the National Security Advisors of India and Pakistan. Coming on the heels of the recent attack in Gurdaspur, it raises urgent questions about possible motivations behind these attacks as well as the appropriate Indian response. The Modi government has rightly refrained from any hasty move and has indicated that the NSA-level talks will proceed as agreed between the Prime Ministers in Ufa. The ball has been lobbed into Pakistan's court. If Islamabad tries to backslide from the talks, it will have to bear the blame for scuttling dialogue.
The reason behind the spurt in the terrorism is not difficult to fathom. By agreeing to let the NSAs meet and by accepting the invitation to attend the SAARC summit in Pakistan next year, Prime Minister Narendra Modi raised the stakes of diplomatic engagement for all concerned. The fact that the statement read out by the two Foreign Secretaries contained no direct reference to Kashmir was seen in India as a point scored against Pakistan. But the real question was why Nawaz Sharif agreed to such a formulation. Was it because Mr. Sharif mistakenly felt he could carry the Pakistani establishment with him? Or was it because the Pakistan army wanted to hand him a long rope by which to hang himself?
In any case, the alacrity with which the Pakistan government disavowed the Indian interpretation of the statement underscored the pressures at work on Mr. Sharif. New Delhi declined to enter into a propaganda debate, insisting correctly that the dialogue should go ahead as laid out in the statement. The terrorist attacks that followed were clearly intended to egg on India to call off the talks or to respond forcefully-perhaps both. In effect, they sought to capitalize on the Modi government's tough image.
The government, however, has done well by refusing to rise to the bait. Equally important, it has so far managed to lead-rather than follow-domestic opinion on this issue. The Congress party's criticism of the government for being "soft" on terrorism was notable only for its lack of imagination. Of greater concern to the government is the BJP's own support base. The Home Minister's assurances about a "befitting reply" are evidently aimed at pacifying this audience. Still, the government might want to tone down its utterances, if only because they also raise expectations of a strong response in the event of a serious provocation by Pakistan. If anything, the government should take the line that defeating Pakistan-sponsored terrorism will be a long game of attrition-one in which patience will be a key asset.
As for actually responding to Pakistani terrorism is concerned, the government has the entire range of political, military and intelligence tool at its disposal. These have been used in various combinations to degrade the capacity of the terrorist organizations and their state-sponsors. The trend in terrorism that we are now witnessing-a marked increase in attacks on soft targets near the LoC and the border-is itself an outcome of our success in reducing cross-border infiltration and insurgent activity in Jammu and Kashmir. For instance, the general officer commanding 15 Corps in Srinagar has noted that there has been no infiltration at all into the Valley this year. Similarly, our operational responses will send more than adequate signals to Pakistan about how we intend to tackle any rise in terrorism. In the past, such tacit signalling has played a more important role in stabilizing levels of violence than explicit statements from India.
Diplomacy is at most of marginal utility in the fight against terrorism. There is no correlation between the levels of violence and our willingness or unwillingness to talk to Pakistan. By the same token, our refusal to engage Pakistan can hardly help address the problem of terrorism. It can only give us a false sense of satisfaction about 'isolating' Pakistan, while in fact we unnecessarily paint ourselves into a corner. By refusing to engage, we allow the Pakistanis to occupy the diplomatic high-ground and draw avoidable international interference in our foreign policy. By contrast, enlarging the diplomatic agenda will enable us to bring more issues and linkages into play. Mr. Modi's initial instinct vis-a-vis Pakistan was close to the mark: India needs to walk and chew gum.
That said, we should temper expectations on what can come out of the meeting between the NSAs. The recent events have certainly strengthened our stand on Pakistan's support for terrorism. The capture of a Pakistani terrorist in Udhampur will give us more credible evidence to thicken the dossier. But the meeting is likely to be lop-sided. While India will table evidence, Pakistan will produce propaganda. There are already reports about Pakistan preparing to confront India about its alleged involvement in Balochistan. Islamabad is apparently planning to take up Indian intelligence activities in Pakistan at the United Nations. Never mind the fact that such Pakistani claims have failed to convince any other country. In short, the NSA-level dialogue on terrorism may not be helpful in tackling the underlying problem. It can be useful insofar as it helps us to begin engaging Pakistan on our own terms. Yet if this engagement is to yield any tangible outcome, the diplomatic agenda will have to broaden beyond terrorism.
(Srinath Raghavan is Senior Fellow at Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi)Disclaimer: The opinions expressed within this article are the personal opinions of the author. The facts and opinions appearing in the article do not reflect the views of NDTV and NDTV does not assume any responsibility or liability for the same.