The two-month-old stand-off between India and China at multiple points on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) began to de-escalate after a lengthy phone call on Sunday between Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Wang Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister. Both are designated Special Representatives of the two nations for resolution of border issues. Three military-to-military meetings had already taken place at the corps commander level before this. Also, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's July 3 visit to Nimu, Ladakh, had upped the ante, with him calling out the perils of expansionism, which resonated across East Asia. The Chinese leadership was notified of the Indian resolve to resist unilateral attempts to alter the status quo.
PM Modi's speech had multiple objectives. It rectified the confusion created by his June 19 television address denying any intrusion by China. If that was so, then what was the whole brouhaha over? Perhaps the intention was to both allay growing domestic concern about the government's handling of the stand-off, while allowing China to restore status quo ante through ongoing military level and diplomatic engagements without losing face. The government realized its misjudgment when Chinese spokespersons latched onto the PM's remark as a certificate of Chinese innocence.
De-escalation is welcome, considering the health and economic challenge posed by the Covid pandemic. However, some questions arise about Chinese objectives and the extent of their achievement. Undeniably, Chinese actions were predictable - if only closer attention had been paid to their statements and behaviour elsewhere along their periphery. Since August last year, when constitutional changes were made to divide Jammu and Kashmir state into two downgraded union territories, China had been voicing an alleged threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Beijing's paranoia would have been fed by the "Howdy Modi" splash in Houston in September and the quick return visit to India by US President Donald Trump in February this year. In between, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a state visit to Nepal in October 2019. The Covid pandemic tying down China from early 2020 meant that Chinese restiveness was discounted. Thus, the spring Chinese military exercises in Tibet were treated as a normal event rather than possible subterfuge for swinging forces towards the LAC in eastern Ladakh.
China already had concerns about India upgrading its connectivity to vital outposts on LAC, particularly a major new road, running at places close to the LAC, leading to the airstrip at Daulat Beg Oldie. This new artery would facilitate a safe and rapid supply line all the way up to the Karakoram Pass. River valleys like Galwan provide two-way access. Thus, China can see this as a potential threat to its vital Tibet-Xinjiang highway called G 219, as indeed to their supply lines to forward posts. Chinese intrusions seem to be aimed at stymying further infrastructure upgrades as also extending more control upto their claim lines, which at many spots overlap with Indian claims. The Chinese specialize in this method of assertion, intrusion and consolidation. In the South China Sea, it began with a nine-dash line, creation of artificial islands, then their militarisation despite commitments to the contrary, and finally, an aggressive air and maritime domain around them.
PM Narendra Modi made a surprise visit to a forward post in Ladakh on Friday days after a deadly border clash with China
This must be remembered as the PLA disengages - easy restoration of the status quo ante is unlikely. Agreeing to buffer zones denies India patrolling of and access to areas it controls, albeit contested by China. On the other hand, China has quickly upgraded its connectivity, for instance in the Galwan Valley, thus both blocking India and retaining a reinforced outpost as the springboard for future action. The full reality would only be known once independent satellite pictures surface which is expected to take a few days.
The mismatch between the reading of disengagement by the two sides emerges from their public statements following the Doval-Wang talk. Indians sense agreement to respect and observe the LAC and to avoid "unilateral action to alter status quo". China talks of positive consensus and for India to "guide public opinion", safeguard normal exchanges and observe agreements.
China has a larger geopolitical purpose also behind the current stand-off. It has, despite agreement on one-nation two-systems, seized direct control of Hong Kong and implemented draconian laws for detention and punishment. By asserting a new territorial claim in eastern Bhutan, it is again testing Indo-Bhutan solidarity and attempting to create a territorial wedge between Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh. This is to outflank Tawang, which China lays claim to, undoubtedly due to its link to past Dalai Lamas. China is also working overtime to ensure that the government of PM KP Sharma Oli in Nepal does not fall. Thus, while major powers are completely distracted by the Covid pandemic and the US, in addition by its presidential election, China is cleaning up distractions along its periphery. Concomitantly, it is warning and belittling India to stymie emerging convergence between Australia, India, Japan and the US ("the Quad") before it develops into an important bloc to contain China's reshaping of global order.
In a poorly-worded advisory to the media, official sources are dubbing it as "Modi effect loud and clear". A "New India" has pushed China back, with PM's Ladakh visit as the "final nail in coffin". "Aatma Nirbhar" India is a "tight slap" to China. This resurrection of the Modi persona as an avenger and defender of the nation was unnecessary and sans finesse. The truth is that China has signalled to other smaller neighbours that it shall act with ruthlessness to advance its geo-strategic interests. The Indian government may chest-thump but in reality, it has been sensibly pragmatic. The priority was to avoid conflict, save face and counter the Covid pandemic while reviving growth.
Restoring normalcy to India-China relations will be an uphill task. China may also have realized that beyond some tactical gain, advantage next lies in de-escalation to avoid permanent fissures. But for the two sides to find a new normal at the LAC, and between them, shall be an arduous trek.
(The writer is a former ambassador to Iran.)
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