India has thrown down the gauntlet before Islamabad by suspending the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960. Through the treaty, Pakistan gets roughly 80% of the waters of western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) that flow through India into Pakistan; India's share from the eastern rivers (Beas, Ravi and Sutlej) is 20%.
The Indian action in suspending the treaty, which has seen many wars and alarms between the two countries, is in response to the Pahalgam terror attack. If Pakistan has sought to strike a blow against India in Kashmir, India has just dangled a sword over what Pakistan Army chief General Asim Munir called its "jugular vein".
Pak Has No Easy Answers
The Indian action could be only a part of retaliatory measures, which may yet see a military strike on Pakistan. But the IWT suspension has confronted Pakistan with a dilemma for which it does not have easy answers. It is true that right now, India lacks the infrastructure in terms of dams, canals, tunnels or storage areas to divert the waters that flow to Pakistan. But in the immediate term, India can hurt Pakistan by halting data sharing, publicising new projects, optimising existing dams and escalating diplomatic pressure, thereby causing public anxiety in the already water-stressed country.
In the medium term, the situation may become more dire for Pakistan if India accelerates dam construction, maximises its eastern river use, and develops diversions and affect the flow of the western rivers. It could significantly impact Pakistan's water-dependent agriculture, hydropower, and economy.
India could immediately stop the sharing of river-flow data, flood warnings and planned projects, as required under the IWT framework. This includes refusing to hold technical meetings or responding to Pakistani queries. Actually, agricultural disruptions are likely if India simply does not provide flood warnings this year, or chooses to open the sluice gates of the Bhakra Dam in the high monsoon season, in August.
A Slew Of Existing Projects
In the longer term, India could publicise plans for accelerating the development of hydro projects with storage capacity, such as Pakal Dul, Ratle, Kiru or Sawalkot, all on the Chenab or its tributaries. India already has the right to use a certain amount of water of the western rivers for irrigation and storage for hydropower projects. Now, with the suspension of the treaty, this storage can be increased beyond the IWT limits.
The Pakal Dul (1,000 MW) project, started in 2018, aims to store 0.125 million acre feet (MAF) of water and also generate electricity. While India says it is permitted storage, Pakistan says it has exceeded the 0.15 MAF limit. However, even this storage could enable India to regulate the Chenab flow, especially during the dry season from April to May.
The Sawalkot (1856 MW) project, also on the Chenab, is a run-of-the-river project with a small reservoir for electricity generation. Construction is yet to begin, but India could increase the size of the reservoir, providing it with a means of disrupting river flows.
The Ratle (850 MW) project is downstream from Pakal Dul, and is a run-of-the-river project with minimal storage. Construction resumed in 2023 after delays, but here, too, India could enlarge the reservoir, something that will affect Pakistan. Kiru (624 MW) is near Ratle, also on the Chenab, and is essentially a hydropower project; its dam and civil works are 50% complete.
Finally, while the Kwar Hydroelectric (540 MW) project on the Chenab has a small reservoir for hydropower, the Nimoo Bazgo (45 MW) is on the Indus in Ladakh and is a small run-of-the-river scheme with no storage.
Other Projects, Elsewhere
There are other proposed or under-development projects too, such as the Bursar Hydroelectric Project (800 MW) on the Marusudar tributary of the Chenab, with a 0.3 MAF storage; this is higher than the limits because India plans to use it for irrigation and hydropower. This is still at the planning stage, and the reservoir can be increased further.
There are also a number of existing projects in Jammu & Kashmir and Himachal, which are technically run-of-the-river hydroelectric projects, with some involving limited storage. But these could be changed.
There is also Baglihar (900 MW) on the Chenab, with a 0.287 MAF storage. The Kishenganga (33 0MW) project is on a tributary of the Jhelum, where India already diverts 7.5 MAF of water through a canal that goes to another Jhelum tributary. This diversion reduces flows to Pakistan's Neelum-Jhelum project, which relies on the same river system.
The Salal Dam (690 MW) also has a small storage capacity within IWT limits, but the project does have the capacity to reduce river flows. The Dulhasti power station (390 MW) on the Chenab again has minimal storage capacity, but its operation contributes to the cumulative downstream effects when taken together with other dams.
India's Short-Term Strategy
While most of the western river projects are, as of now, run-of-the-river schemes where India can only impound a limited amount of water, Pakistan has been afraid that their combined effect could reduce the flows of the Chenab by 5-10%. If India actually sets out to hurt Pakistan, the damage could be more severe. As it is, estimates are that there is a 7-12% reduction of the flow during the lean season, something that could increase on account of climate change.
Indeed, Indian officials have now announced that among short-term strategies, there will be the desilting of the existing dams on the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab rivers, which could significantly reduce water flows to Pakistan.
Predictably, Pakistan has talked tough against India on account of the IWT suspension. A statement from the office of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said that any attempt to stop or divert the waters "will be considered as an act of war and responded to with full force across the complete spectrum of national power". That reference to "complete spectrum" is a threat to use nuclear weapons as well. According to a report, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed has warned that the LeT will "pull out [India's] tongue" and "stop its breath" in response to the Indian action of suspension of the IWT.
What Pakistani Retaliation May Look Like
Pakistan's ability to counter the IWT suspension is shaped by its economic constraints, water dependency, and geopolitical position. It could appeal to the World Bank - though it only plays a facilitator's role for the treaty, not a regulator's one. Pakistan could also appeal to the United Nations, but its role is also minimal in such issues. Or, Islamabad could appeal to its allies in the Organisation of Islamic States, or even to China. Given the threat that the IWT suspension poses, Pakistan is likely to commit itself to a high-profile, high-decibel campaign. The last will be the military option, which could see an increase in forces along the LoC, suspension of the ongoing ceasefire, and an increase in terrorist attacks in Kashmir.
In the medium term, there are also steps Pakistan could take to strengthen its domestic water management. This would mean increasing the construction of its domestic water storage capacity for drinking water and irrigation. Pakistan is currently able to store just about 10% of its IWT share in the Mangala and Tarbela dams. This means an acceleration of the construction of the Diamer Bhasa, as well as perhaps initiating the construction of the Kalabagh Dam on the Indus River.
Not A Pretty Picture For Pak
All in all, water scarcity and agricultural losses could fuel public unrest, putting pressure on Pakistan's civilian government and military leadership. Farmers, a significant political constituency, may demand immediate action, complicating the country's already unstable governance.
Whether or not India will also use the military option is not known at this stage. But its suspension of the IWT itself is tantamount to a slow strangulation of Pakistan. As much as 80% of Pakistan's cultivated land relies on the Indus River system for irrigation, contributing 25% to its GDP.
New Delhi needs to combine its action with active diplomacy to convince the Pakistan army that the time has come to dismantle its jihad machinery. Countries like the US, France, Saudi Arabia or the UAE can be roped in to push for Pakistani compliance. The country is already a failing state, it cannot afford the threat that India is now posing. For now, that threat is existential, not immediate. It provides Islamabad - and Rawalpindi - with enough time to reflect.
(The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
