Opinion: Simultaneous Polls - Dispelling The Myth Of "Disruption"

The idea of synchronising elections for Lok Sabha and state assemblies has ignited a passionate debate, garnering strong support and vehement resistance alike. Advocates argue it would save resources, reduce election fatigue, and streamline governance. In our previous column on this platform, we expounded on the advantages of synchronising elections for both Lok Sabha and state assemblies.

However, some resist this idea, fearing the potential disruption of the existing electoral cycle and the potential for the centralisation of power. Simultaneous elections could be perceived as a threat to the status quo, as they may require constitutional amendments and significant modifications to the electoral process. The prospect of altering long-standing traditions (from 1967 onwards, national and state-level elections have not been simultaneous) can make stakeholders hesitant to embrace such a significant shift.

Also, information asymmetry plays a role in shaping opinions on simultaneous elections. Key stakeholders may lack access to comprehensive data on the logistical, financial, and political implications of conducting elections concurrently. Without a clear understanding of both the benefits and potential drawbacks, decision-makers may be more inclined to reject the idea, as they may not fully grasp its advantages and disadvantages. Consequently, this information gap can perpetuate existing practices and hinder the implementation of a potentially transformative idea like simultaneous elections.

Principles for Conducting Simultaneous Elections

The NITI Aayog's paper on implementing simultaneous elections presents a comprehensive framework for executing it. Due to the constraints of this article's word count, we will outline several foundational principles related to simultaneous elections.

(a) Synchronising the electoral cycles of state assemblies and Lok Sabha for the first time would not be feasible without a single instance of extension or reduction of the current tenures of either most of the Legislative Assemblies or Lok Sabha itself. Consequently, any viable approach to instituting simultaneous elections would inevitably necessitate suitable one-time modifications to the terms of Lok Sabha or state assemblies.

(b) The 18th Lok Sabha elections are due in 2024, with the 19th Lok Sabha elections anticipated in 2029, assuming a standard five-year term. If simultaneous elections are initiated for the 18th Lok Sabha, which has to be in place by June 2024, a two-month, multi-phase election process could be considered. Thus, April to May 2024 is proposed as the initial window for implementing simultaneous elections.

(c) Anchoring the simultaneous election cycle to that of Lok Sabha will require adjustments to the terms of state assemblies, founded upon mutually agreeable principles. This will be a one-time curtailment or extension of the tenure of assemblies. Moreover, these principles must adhere to constitutional and statutory constraints while also being broadly accepted by diverse stakeholders, including political parties, governments, and the general electorate.

(d) What will happen if Lok Sabha is prematurely dissolved? The Election Commission of India came up with a solution for this. To prevent premature dissolution, a "no-confidence motion" against the government should also include a "confidence motion" for a named individual as the future Prime Minister, with both motions voted on concurrently. If Lok Sabha dissolution remains unavoidable, the following options could be considered: (i) If the remaining term is short (specified period), the President may administer the country, aided by an appointed Council of Ministers, until the next House is constituted at the scheduled time; (ii) If the remaining term is long (specified period), fresh elections may be held, with the newly-elected House serving for the remainder of the original term.

(e) In cases of premature Legislative Assembly dissolution, a simultaneous "confidence motion" for an alternative government should be mandated alongside a "no-confidence motion." This would generally prevent premature dissolutions. If dissolution is unavoidable, the Governor should be able to administer the state with an appointed Council of Ministers or impose President's Rule until the term ends. If no party forms a government after the general election, necessitating another election, the subsequent House's term should cover the remainder of the original term. In cases where the government resigns, and no alternative is viable, fresh elections can be considered if the remaining term is lengthy (specified period). Otherwise, Governor's or President's Rule can be imposed.

Criticism of Simultaneous Elections

However, there has been a lot of criticism ever since the discussion about the simultaneous elections came to the fore in early 2018. Primarily there are three sets of criticisms. 

(1) That it is politically motivated and may influence voter behaviour in a manner that voters would end up voting on national issues even for state elections. Critics believe this shift in voting patterns could potentially encourage the electorate to support candidates from a single political party in both parliamentary and state elections.

(2) Some have also criticised the operational feasibility of simultaneous elections and suggested that this approach appears to be impractical and unattainable.

(3) As discussed earlier, the implementation of simultaneous elections requires constitutional amendments that modify the terms of the legislature. Consequently, another critique arises in connection with this issue. The critics are of the view that this could potentially alter the basic structure of the federal architecture and compromise the political autonomy of states.

Breaking Down Criticism

Let us look into each of these criticisms one by one. It is not necessarily true that local issues would be diminished due to simultaneous elections. Voting in India is a multifaceted phenomenon influenced by numerous factors, such as government incumbency, political party organisation in state assemblies and constituencies, party stances on national and state issues, and political alliances, among others.

There is no empirical evidence available to conclusively determine the voting behaviour of the electorate in a given state, regardless of whether elections are held concurrently or separately. Considering the ground realities before concluding that simultaneous elections would alter voting patterns in favour of parties with a strong central base is essential. Instances exist where voters have supported smaller, state, or regional parties in elections for the House of the People, despite prevailing national trends favouring specific national parties. Delhi and Odisha are classic examples.

The electoral landscape in India presents a compelling dichotomy, with voting patterns in the Delhi legislative assembly elections differing significantly from those in the Lok Sabha elections, despite their temporal proximity. In the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, all seven seats were won by the BJP; however, just a few months later, the electorate provided a resounding near-full majority to the AAP. In Odisha, where elections are held simultaneously, the BJP experienced a considerable disparity in vote share between the 2019 parliamentary (38.4%) and assembly elections (32.5%).

It is overly simplistic and erroneous to attribute the complexities of the Indian electorate's voting behaviour to a single determinant. This reductionist assumption stems from an intellectual tendency to underestimate the discernment of voters and to question their capacity to make informed decisions that align with their best interests.

As far as the operational viability of simultaneous elections is concerned, both the NITI Aayog paper and the Law Commission of India's Draft Report on simultaneous elections have made it abundantly clear that it is operationally feasible.

As far as centre-state relations are concerned, simultaneous elections in India can be conducted without disrupting the federal architecture or compromising the political autonomy of states. (a) As explained earlier, voters would retain the ability to elect different political parties at the central and state levels, thereby ensuring that regional issues and preferences are not subsumed by national concerns. There would be a one-time curtailment of state assemblies. However, in case of the dissolution of state assemblies or Lok Sabha, a parity will be followed. (b) President's rule in the state would be imposed only in the case of the remaining term of the dissolved assembly below a decided threshold. This period should not be long.

In this analysis of simultaneous elections in India, we have explored the potential advantages, challenges, and criticisms associated with the concept. It is crucial to acknowledge the central role of the Indian electorate in this process, as their discerning wisdom and unpredictability ultimately determine electoral outcomes. Indian voters are adept at considering national and regional issues concurrently, much like the simultaneous elections under discussion. Ultimately, it is the voter who holds the power to shape the future of the electoral landscape. 

Bibek Debroy is the Chairman, Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister (EAC-PM) & Aditya Sinha is Additional Private Secretary (Policy & Research), EAC-PM.

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author.