Now that the dust has settled somewhat on last Friday's Oval Office public spat between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his host the United States President Donald Trump, the time is opportune to pick up the broken crockery and figure the damage done. As enough has already been written and commented on the event itself, this article will instead focus on the short-to-medium-term consequences of the event on various stakeholders.
A Greek Tragedy
Like a Greek tragedy, there are no winners in the last act at the White House. While President Zelensky may have had the satisfaction of proving himself as an underdog standing up to a bullying superpower and burnished his nationalist image at home, Ukraine has lost significantly at least in two ways: denial of any US security guarantees – the ostensible purpose of the White House visit, as well as a likely discontinuation of support from the US, hitherto Kyiv's biggest backer. The beleaguered Ukrainians are already outgunned and outmanned on the battlefield. They are now even more vulnerable as the two superpowers connive their fate behind their back. In short, while the White House spat might have helped Zelensky secure his position, it upturned his desperate attempt to obtain security guarantees for Ukraine.
This Costs America
Without dwelling on various conspiracy theories, such as this being a setup or a political ambush to cow down President Zelensky, the public episode has considerable moral and material costs for the United States' status as a superpower as well as personally for the White House occupant.
Firstly, the US has failed to get access to the coveted strategic rare earth elements in Ukraine and recoup nearly $200 billion worth of assistance. Further, by reneging upon the strategic military and civil assistance aid provided by the previous President and converting the past grants into loans to be paid back through usurped natural resources, Trump created a situation where henceforth all gifts from Washington would be suspected of being later accompanied by an IOU.
Secondly, by hosting bilateral talks with Russia in Riyadh on Ukraine, without either Kyiv or Brussels being present, Washington had reawakened the unpleasant memories of a Munich-type betrayal of Ukraine, a friend and ally. The conduct would raise serious doubts about the reliability of the United States' commitments to its allies across the world and cause considerable reputational damage to Washington's soft and hard powers.
Thirdly, by publicly bullying an invited Head of State in a petulant and subjective manner, the US has cast itself as an unpredictable patron and volatile negotiator.
Lastly, it does little to dignify the image of a presumed hyperpower if its Head of State is seen in a slanging match with a disproportionately smaller interlocutor.
Trump's Freudian Slips
At a personal level, Trump stood damaged by his several Freudian Slips on display at the White House by the unwitting rekindling of the controversies that dogged Trump 1.0. His public upbraiding of Zelensky on February 28 at the White House can be seen as a payback for an impeachment trial by the US Congress. In 2019, Trump was accused of phoning Zelensky to ask for launching an investigation against the son of Joe Biden his presumed Democratic opponent at the approaching elections, then working with a Ukrainian company, as a pre-condition to get $400 million in American military assistance.
Further, his emotive and stout defence of Russian President Vladimir Putin (“he went together a lot with me”) also harks back to an FBI investigation into the swirling allegations of Russian interference in his favour in the 2016 elections. While both these allegations were eventually dropped, Trump's reference to his past karmas during the White House spat – from settling scores with Zelensky, a visceral animus for his predecessor and defending Putin against domestic investigations, were self-goals likely to tainted him as a tempestuous maverick prone to mix his personal domestic agenda with national interest abroad. From now onwards, any steps he takes on the Ukraine-Russia conflict, including significant relaxation of the 21,000-plus economic sanctions on Russia, may invite scrutiny about bias in favour of Russia and President Putin complicating his self-proclaimed neutrality.
Putin Is Not The Winner Here
Most observers have loudly proclaimed Putin as the solitary winner of the Oval Office imbroglio. However, on a closer look, this conclusion appears questionable. Putin and Russian nationalists may gloat over a fall-out between Ukraine and United States, the hitherto chief mentor and sustainer of their opponent on the battlefield. But the episode pushes down the timeline for the end of the conflict, a priority for the Kremlin. It also makes easing of crippling economic sanctions less likely. In case the West Europeans take up the slack and reinvigorate the defence supplies to Kyiv, and create an autonomous anti-Russian defence alliance, this would disserve Moscow's interests. A united European defence bloc will be a formidable opponent with a combined GDP 11 times bigger than Russia's. It would have two nuclear powers each with permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Lastly, this continental repolarisation would also have opportunity costs for Moscow as prospects for an early post-war resumption of energy symbiosis would recede even further.
What Next?
The February 28 White House clash has pushed the Europeans towards their moment of truth as they face a Hobson's choice on two issues: the need to reverse their centrifugal tendencies, and collective militarisation against Putin's Russia perceived as an expansionist threat seeking to re-merge the former Soviet components. The EU economies have recorded an anaemic growth of 1.1% in 2024 and are likely to grow only by 1.6% this year. They are, thus, in poor shape to rev up their defence expenditure in a sustainable manner and fill the gap voided by the US. While the London Summit on March 2 showed an impressive NATO lineup, it still preferred to bring the US back into the alliance backing Ukraine – a prospect that may need time and selective amnesia, both in short supply amidst an unrelenting war.
At a different level, other go-between peacemakers, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, may strive to step into the void and offer to host multilateral talks to end the Russia-Ukraine war. However, the issue of the Washington-Moscow reset may then need to be dissociated from the Ukraine conflict.
China has considerable stakes in the Russia-Ukraine war. On one hand, Beijing has leveraged the hostilities and resultant Russia's isolation to forge a “no-limit” strategic partnership with Moscow. On the other hand, the Western preoccupation with Moscow has allowed China time and space to continue with its drive to dominate its neighbourhood. Thus, a jerky US-Ukraine and US-NATO partings may be a mixed blessing for Beijing. It may invite the unwelcomed resumption of Washington's ‘pivot Asia' policy to contain China. Further, any eventual normalisation of Russia's ties with the West may correspondingly reduce Moscow's ardour for Beijing. In case West Europe morphs into a defence bloc, the resultant multipolarity may, however, suit Beijing.
What This Means For India
India – and much of the Global South – have been collateral victims of the three-year Ukraine crisis, facing supply chain disruption of global trade of vital commodities from foodstuff to hydrocarbons. They would have been dismayed at the White House spat, fearing it to prolong the crisis. The US fixation with “such good friends” as Ukraine, Israel, etc has often overridden its engagements with less pressing horizontal global issues, such as poverty, hunger, disease, climate change, energy and other regional tensions. The incident may, optimistically, allow the Trump Presidency, currently downsizing its foreign engagements, to correct its course both qualitatively and quantitatively.
Six weeks into Trump 2.0, the opening overture of the White House's high-adrenaline campaign to reconfigure the eight-decade global as well as domestic architecture has generated more heat than light. Recent controversial decisions such as 'Riviera' Gaza, the Ukrainian Rare Earth deal, suspended animation of retaliatory tariffs, deportation of illegal migrants, etc test, in general, limits of unilateralism. It would be interesting to watch how their feedback is internalised. If taken positively, it may offer the opportunity for mid-course correction and soften rough policy contours. The London Summit's reported scramble to put together a ‘Ukraine Peace Plan' to be presented to President Trump may provide a pathway for de-escalation and re-engagement. However, if Trump White House continues to pander to its “America First” base, the hubris may catch up sooner than later. Nevertheless, it would be prudent to keep the seatbelts fastened for a likely rough roller coaster ride.
(Mahesh Sachdev is a retired Indian Ambassador. He currently heads Eco-Diplomacy and Strategies, a Delhi-based consultancy.)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
