Washington:
The United States has expanded the role of American diplomats in collecting intelligence overseas and at the United Nations, ordering State Department personnel to gather the credit card and frequent-flier numbers, work schedules and other personal information of foreign dignitaries.
Revealed in classified State Department cables, the directives, going back to 2008, appear to blur the traditional boundaries between statesmen and spies.
The cables give a laundry list of instructions for how State Department employees can fulfill the demands of a "National Humint Collection Directive" in specific countries. ("Humint" is spy-world jargon for human intelligence collection.) One cable asks officers overseas to gather information about "office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cellphones, pagers and faxes," as well as "internet and intranet 'handles', internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent-flier account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information."
The cables, sent to embassies in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the United States mission to the United Nations, provide no evidence that American diplomats are actively trying to steal the secrets of foreign countries, work that is traditionally the preserve of the nation's spy agencies. While the State Department has long provided information about foreign officials' duties to the Central Intelligence Agency to help build biographical profiles, the more intrusive personal information diplomats are now being asked to gather could be used by the National Security Agency for data mining and surveillance operations. A frequent-flier number, for example, could be used to track the travel plans of foreign officials.
Several of the cables also asked diplomats for details about the telecommunications networks supporting the military and intelligence agencies of foreign countries.
The United States regularly puts undercover intelligence officers in foreign countries posing as diplomats, but the vast majority of diplomats are not spies. Several retired ambassadors, told about the information-gathering assignments disclosed in the cables, expressed concern that State Department employees abroad could routinely come under suspicion of spying and find it difficult to carry out their work or even risk expulsion.
Ronald E. Neumann, a former American ambassador to Afghanistan, Algeria and Bahrain, said that Washington was constantly sending requests for voluminous information about foreign countries. But he said he was puzzled about why Foreign Service officers -- who are not trained in clandestine collection methods -- would be asked to gather information like credit card numbers.
"My concerns would be, first of all, whether the person could do this responsibly without getting us into trouble," he said. "And, secondly, how much effort a person put into this at the expense of his or her regular duties."
The requests made to State Department employees have come at a time when the nation's spy agencies are struggling to meet the demands of two wars and a global hunt for militants. The Pentagon has also sharply expanded its intelligence work outside of war zones, sending teams of Special Operations troops to American embassies abroad to gather information about militant networks in various countries.
Unlike the thousands of cables, originally obtained by the anti-secrecy group WikiLeaks, that were sent from far-flung embassies to State Department headquarters, the roughly half-dozen cables from 2008 and 2009 detailing the more aggressive intelligence collection were sent from Washington and signed by Secretaries of State Condoleezza Rice and Hillary Rodham Clinton.
One of the cables, signed by Secretary Clinton, lists information-gathering priorities to American staff members at the United Nations headquarters in New York, including "biographic and biometric information on ranking North Korean diplomats."
While several international treaties prohibit spying at the United Nations, it is an open secret that countries try nevertheless. In one embarrassing episode in 2004, a British official revealed that the United States and Britain eavesdropped on the conversations of Secretary General Kofi Annan of the United Nations in the weeks before the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
The requests for more personal data about foreign officials were included in several cables requesting all manner of information from posts overseas, information that would seem to be the typical business of diplomats.
State Department officials in Asunción, Paraguay, were asked in March 2008 about the presence of Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas in the lawless "Tri-Border" area of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina. Diplomats in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo were asked in April 2009 about crop yields, rates of H.I.V. contraction and China's quest for copper, cobalt and oil in Africa.
In a cable sent to the American Embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria, in June 2009, the State Department requested information about the Bulgarian government's efforts to crack down on money laundering and drug trafficking and for "details about personal relations between Bulgarian leaders and Russian officials or businessmen."
And a cable sent on Oct. 31, 2008, to the embassies in Israel, Jordan, Egypt and elsewhere asked for information on "Palestinian issues," including "Palestinian plans, intentions and efforts to influence US positions on the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations." To get both sides, the State Department also sought information on "Israeli leadership intentions and strategy toward managing the US relationship."
Revealed in classified State Department cables, the directives, going back to 2008, appear to blur the traditional boundaries between statesmen and spies.
The cables give a laundry list of instructions for how State Department employees can fulfill the demands of a "National Humint Collection Directive" in specific countries. ("Humint" is spy-world jargon for human intelligence collection.) One cable asks officers overseas to gather information about "office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cellphones, pagers and faxes," as well as "internet and intranet 'handles', internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent-flier account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information."
The cables, sent to embassies in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the United States mission to the United Nations, provide no evidence that American diplomats are actively trying to steal the secrets of foreign countries, work that is traditionally the preserve of the nation's spy agencies. While the State Department has long provided information about foreign officials' duties to the Central Intelligence Agency to help build biographical profiles, the more intrusive personal information diplomats are now being asked to gather could be used by the National Security Agency for data mining and surveillance operations. A frequent-flier number, for example, could be used to track the travel plans of foreign officials.
Several of the cables also asked diplomats for details about the telecommunications networks supporting the military and intelligence agencies of foreign countries.
The United States regularly puts undercover intelligence officers in foreign countries posing as diplomats, but the vast majority of diplomats are not spies. Several retired ambassadors, told about the information-gathering assignments disclosed in the cables, expressed concern that State Department employees abroad could routinely come under suspicion of spying and find it difficult to carry out their work or even risk expulsion.
Ronald E. Neumann, a former American ambassador to Afghanistan, Algeria and Bahrain, said that Washington was constantly sending requests for voluminous information about foreign countries. But he said he was puzzled about why Foreign Service officers -- who are not trained in clandestine collection methods -- would be asked to gather information like credit card numbers.
"My concerns would be, first of all, whether the person could do this responsibly without getting us into trouble," he said. "And, secondly, how much effort a person put into this at the expense of his or her regular duties."
The requests made to State Department employees have come at a time when the nation's spy agencies are struggling to meet the demands of two wars and a global hunt for militants. The Pentagon has also sharply expanded its intelligence work outside of war zones, sending teams of Special Operations troops to American embassies abroad to gather information about militant networks in various countries.
Unlike the thousands of cables, originally obtained by the anti-secrecy group WikiLeaks, that were sent from far-flung embassies to State Department headquarters, the roughly half-dozen cables from 2008 and 2009 detailing the more aggressive intelligence collection were sent from Washington and signed by Secretaries of State Condoleezza Rice and Hillary Rodham Clinton.
One of the cables, signed by Secretary Clinton, lists information-gathering priorities to American staff members at the United Nations headquarters in New York, including "biographic and biometric information on ranking North Korean diplomats."
While several international treaties prohibit spying at the United Nations, it is an open secret that countries try nevertheless. In one embarrassing episode in 2004, a British official revealed that the United States and Britain eavesdropped on the conversations of Secretary General Kofi Annan of the United Nations in the weeks before the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
The requests for more personal data about foreign officials were included in several cables requesting all manner of information from posts overseas, information that would seem to be the typical business of diplomats.
State Department officials in Asunción, Paraguay, were asked in March 2008 about the presence of Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas in the lawless "Tri-Border" area of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina. Diplomats in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo were asked in April 2009 about crop yields, rates of H.I.V. contraction and China's quest for copper, cobalt and oil in Africa.
In a cable sent to the American Embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria, in June 2009, the State Department requested information about the Bulgarian government's efforts to crack down on money laundering and drug trafficking and for "details about personal relations between Bulgarian leaders and Russian officials or businessmen."
And a cable sent on Oct. 31, 2008, to the embassies in Israel, Jordan, Egypt and elsewhere asked for information on "Palestinian issues," including "Palestinian plans, intentions and efforts to influence US positions on the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations." To get both sides, the State Department also sought information on "Israeli leadership intentions and strategy toward managing the US relationship."
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